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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates how spousal age gaps influence the allocation of housework 
between husbands and wives. Further, we consider the identity formed as a result of 
respondents’ family backgrounds by specifically exploring the effects of the age gaps 
between the respondents’ parents. 
We initially collect an individual-level panel dataset covering the periods before and 
after marriage, by monthly surveys of unmarried persons in the initial period prior to 
marriage, then the three-year period that follows. After controlling for individual- and 
time period-fixed effects, the key findings are as follows: (1) after marriage, women older 
than their husbands tend to become burdened with a larger amount of housework, and the 
spousal gap effect increases as the marriage duration increases; (2) women with mothers 
older than their fathers tend to assume a larger allocation of the housework as the marriage 
duration increases; and (3) the age gap hardly affects the men’s allocation of housework, 
although men with a full-time working mother at age 15 assume a larger allocation of 
housework as the marriage duration increases.   
 
JEL classification: J12; J16; D13 
Keywords: Spousal age gaps; housework allocation; intra-household bargaining 
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1. Introduction 
 
The allocation of housework between spouses is increasingly important in considering 
how the spousal relationship influences economic efficiency in the labor market. The 
bargaining model assumes that such characteristics as education, weight, and age—which 
are highly valued in marriage markets—influence an individual’s intra-household 
bargaining power (e.g., Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque, 2012; Grossbard and 
Mukhopadhyay, 2017). The differences in an individual’s characteristics relative to their 
spouse’s generate differences in bargaining power within a couple, and consequently 
influence the partner-selection process as well as the household specialization after 
marriage.1 For instance, economic researchers have constructed theoretical models based 
on assumption that men prefer younger women (e.g., Siow, 1998; Diaz-Gimenez and 
Giolito, 2013)2. Accordingly, a couple’s age difference is a key factor in decision-making 
about marriage and marital life.3 In the real world, the number of “toy boy” marital 
couples—in which the female partner is at least five years older than her male partner—
have substantially increased since the 1970s in the United States and United Kindom. 
Coles and Francesconi (2011) attempted to explain this phenomenon by considering a 
mechanism in which a wife older than her husband earns more to compensate for the 
younger husband’s disutility; these authors assumed that men and women both prefer 
younger spouses.4   
Researchers disagree about the optimal spousal age gap to maximize marital gains. 
The gains from marriage become the largest in older husband-younger wife pairs, which 
parallels the positive “traditional family” perspective (Bergstrom and Bagnoli, 1993). In 
contrast, other studies report that similarly aged couples experience the largest marital 
gains (Choo and Siow, 2006; Mansour and McKinnish, 2014). Analyses incorporating 
online and speed-dating data provided evidence that both men and women prefer partners 
                                                     
1 However, gender differences in such developed countries as Japan have gradually disappeared 
in the marriage market (Yamamura and Tsutsui, 2017). 
2 Fecundity declines more rapidly for women than men, which results in the genders’ difference 
in preferences regarding the age differences within a couple (Diaz-Gimenez and Giolito, 2013). 
3 Booth and Kee (2009) examined the spousal age gap’s effects on fertility, although this gap 
hardly had an influence. 
4 Bloemen and Stancanelli (2015) used French data to discover that larger spousal age 
differences are positively associated with couples in which only the wife works, but negatively 
with dual-earner households, in which the wife out-earns the husband. 
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similar in age (Belot and Francesconi, 2013). Further, Groot and van den Brink (2002) 
proposed two different hypotheses about the reasons for marriage—the financial support 
and social equality hypotheses—which focus on the fact that the husband is typically 
older and more educated than his wife. The authors use panel data from the Netherlands 
to demonstrate that this tendency is explained by the financial support hypothesis.  
 Gender identity theory explains gender differences in the allocation of time between 
spouses if other things are equal (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).5 This is partially why 
women are less likely than men to be full-time workers, even when her labor quality is 
high enough to work full-time. According to Bertrand et al. (2015), for couples in which 
the wife’s potential income is likely to exceed the husband’s, the wife is less likely to be 
in the labor force, and earns less than her potential income even if she does work. Further, 
the wife spends more time on housework than her husband even in couples in which the 
wife earns more. Empirical analyses have revealed that women are inclined to spend more 
time on typically “female” tasks, such as cooking and cleaning (e.g., Hersch, 2009; 
Hersch and Stratton, 2002).6 Regarding gender identity formation, children learn from 
their parents to form their world views and social value, while individual preferences are 
transmitted in communities through families (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Bisin et al., 2004). 
Booth and Kee (2009) investigate the family-specific “cultural transmission” to find that 
the size of the woman’s family of origin is positively associated with complete fertility in 
her destination family. Moreover, men with working mothers tend to prefer working 
wives (Kawaguchi and Miyazaki, 2009), and thus, the wives of men with working 
mothers are significantly more likely to work (Fernandez et al., 2004). In the pre-marriage 
period, family characteristics also influence the selection of a marital partner; individuals 
marry partners who share the same cultural and social backgrounds (Bisin and Verdier, 
2000).   
This paper essentially assumes that both genders value a degree of youth in the 
marriage market, which therefore increases an individual’s intra-household bargaining 
                                                     
5 Existing works use data from Western countries—such as the United Kingdom (Booth and 
Van Ours, 2008), Australia (Booth and Van Ours, 2009) and the Netherlands (Booth and Van 
Ours, 2013)—to empirically test the identity theory and investigate gender differences in the 
relationship between part-time work and subjective well-being. 
6 However, in such developed countries as Japan, gender differences have gradually 
disappeared from the marriage market (Yamamura and Tsutsui, 2017). 
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power.7 Further, we added an identity factor to examine how the spousal age gap impacts 
the allocation of housework between husband and wife. Further, we also consider the 
identity formed as a result of the family background by exploring the effects of the 
differences in age between the respondent’s parents. This analysis involves initially 
collecting an individual-level panel dataset throughout Japan, and covering the periods 
before and after marriage through monthly surveys of unmarried persons in the initial 
period, then tracking them for three years after. Compared with existing works (e.g., 
Booth and Van Ours, 2008; 2009; 2013; Grossbard et al., 2014; Grossbard and 
Mukhopadhyay, 2017), our original data is advantageous, as it enables us to collect 
information about the allocation of housework and the timing of such events as marriage, 
cohabitation, pregnancy, and childbirth. Additionally, frequent surveys in this short period 
are less likely to suffer from changes in other factors. We also obtain data about the 
respondent’s characteristics as well as those of his or her partner to use information 
regarding couple and their parents. This novel data allows us to consider the gender 
identity’s role and how the difference in age within a couple influences their allocation of 
housework. 
This paper’s major findings are as follows: After marriage, women older than their 
partners tend to burden with a larger amount of housework, and the age gap’s effect 
increases as the marriage duration increases. Additionally, the age gap between the 
respondents’ mother and father also caused female respondents to increase their allocation 
of housework; this effect also increases as the marriage duration increases. This paper 
contributes to current literature by providing evidence that women are primarily affected 
by a couple’s age gap and the identity formed by learning from one’s parents.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 proposes testable 
hypotheses, while Section 3 explains the data and the empirical method used. Section 4 
presents the estimation results and their interpretation, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
                                                     
7 In a study of obesity and its effect on the labor market (Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque, 
2012; Grossbard and Mukhopadhyay, 2017), it was found that female thinness is valued in 
marriage markets, which increases her intra-marriage bargaining power (Vaillant and Wolff, 
2011). 
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Household decision-making is likely to be determined by joint decision-making, and 
in instances of partners’ conflicting preferences, the outcome might depend on the 
partner’s bargaining power. This power is partially determined by the couple’s differences 
in characteristics. For instance, younger people are more valuable in the marriage market, 
which increases his or her bargaining power relative to his or her spouse (Coles and 
Francesconi, 2011). A mechanism seems to exist in that the older person is likely to 
assume a larger allocation of housework to compensate for their disutility toward the 
younger spouse. Thus, we propose the following Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals older than their spouses have weaker bargaining power, 
leading them to assume a larger allocation of housework. 
 
However, the spousal age gap’s effects depend on gender identity. According to 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, p.747), “the husband loses [his] identity when he does 
housework and when his wife earns more than half the household income. Equality of 
utility is restored when the wife undertakes more housework than her husband.” In 
contrast, the wife loses her identity when she does not do housework and earn more than 
husband. Therefore, the age gap’s effect on the amount of housework differs between 
genders. Hence, we propose the following Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2: The age gap has a larger effect on women than men regarding the 
allocation of housework. 
 
Further, the difference in bargaining power between the spouses’ parents possibly 
formed their children’s identity about the allocation of housework within a couple. If 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 hold true, a woman with a mother older than her father 
has grown up in a family in which her mother assumes a larger amount of housework than 
families with a mother younger than the father. If so, the woman will follow her mother 
and assume a larger amount of housework than other women. Accordingly, we propose 
the following Hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 3: A woman with a mother older than her father tends to assume a larger 
amount of housework.  
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The spousal age gap seems to be a key factor in selecting a partner, which 
subsequently influences the allocation of housework even if bargaining power does not 
exist. If so, the allocation of housework might be determined before marriage. Existing 
works argue that couples who marry with imperfect information can change the benefits 
of marriage, as any benefits could not be predicted at the time of the marriage (Becker, 
Landes, and Michael, 1977; Weiss and Willis, 1997). Therefore, this imperfect 
information might cause the marital couple to make decisions about the allocation of 
housework through intra-household bargaining. As we consider it crucial to identify the 
age gap’s effects, the primary problem is as follows: If women married to younger 
husbands initially burden them with a greater allocation of housework, does this larger 
allocation of housework persist, increase, or decrease over the duration of the marriage? 
If the allocation of housework does not change, this is not the outcome of intra-household 
bargaining. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is proposed: 
Hypothesis 4: The effects of the spousal age gap increases as the marital duration 
increases.  
 
3. Methods and Data  
 
3.1. Data  
We collected our data through Internet surveys to realize our project objectives; 
specifically, we commissioned INTAGE Communications Inc., a Japanese market 
research company with sufficient experience in conducting academic Internet surveys. 
INTAGE conducted the Internet surveys under the direction of the research team, 
primarily composed of researchers from Osaka University. The relationship within a 
couple is likely to change, and depends on various life events, such as marriage or having 
a child. We aimed to scrutinize these effects by monthly surveys, which pursued the same 
people planning to get married in the near future to their current significant other. 
Specifically, monthly Internet surveys were conducted from March 2012 to March 2015, 
or a total of 37 waves during this period, and these surveys gathered individual-level panel 
data covering all regions of Japan. As some individuals from the initial survey dropped 
out of the sample during the three-year survey period, we added new individuals annually 
to keep sample size large enough to conduct a statistical estimation; the response rate was 
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approximately 60%.  
This paper examines how the spousal age gap influences the allocation of housework, 
and how this effect changes before and after marriage. Spouses are less likely to live 
together before marriage, and thus, partners are less likely to influence the allocation of 
and time spent on housework. Cohabitation substantially forms a household, even if they 
are not yet married. Accordingly, we considered marriage and cohabitation to be a 
threshold to change their allocation of housework. Therefore, the surveys’ targets were 
limited to men and women who have been unmarried or were not cohabitating at the time 
of the initial survey, and have since married or cohabitated during the studied period. 
Naturally, older individuals were not included; participants’ ages ranged between 17 and 
51 years.  
The questionnaires included various items querying the respondents’ individual 
socioeconomic characteristics, such as whether the couple lived together, their marital 
status, education, age, sex, household income, mother’s work status when the respondent 
was 15 years old, housework hours, and the allocation of housework. Further, we also 
obtained detailed characteristics about his or her partner at the initial survey—although 
we did not directly ask the partner—including the respondent partner’s education, age, 
and parents’ ages. We then used the survey panel data to explore how the age gaps within 
a couple impact time allocation, both before and after a marriage. The sample used for 
our estimation consists of 300 individuals who frequently appeared in surveys at different 
time points. Further, a sample size of over 5,800 was used for the estimations, as this data 
set allows us to conduct a fixed-effects analysis to identify within-marriage changes in 
the allocation of household work over time; this contrasts a cross-sectional analysis that 
compares recently married couples to those with a longer marital duration. A substantial 
advantage of our data is that it enables us to ascertain whether the allocation of housework 
within a couple evolves differently over the duration of the marriage for differently aged 
couples compared to similarly aged couples. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the observations changed, both before and after a marriage or 
cohabitation. 8  The zero on the horizontal line indicates the time point at which 
                                                     
8 This includes observations not used for the regression estimation, as some independent 
variables are not obtained. 
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respondents got married or began to cohabitate with their partner. If respondents began 
cohabitating before marriage, we define zero as the point at which cohabitation began, 
even if the couple is not yet married. Positive values are the months after the marriage or 
cohabitation, while the negative values are the months before it. This demonstrates that 
the observations after marriage (or cohabitation) are larger than before it, although the 
number of the samples before is considered large enough to compare the situations before 
and after.  
Table 1 presents the definitions of the variables used in this research and their mean 
values for the questionnaire respondents, but not their spouses. We can observe from 
Table 1 that the spousal age gap reveals positive and negative values for men and women, 
respectively. This seems to reflect that older men tend to marry younger women. Let us 
consider the age-gap distribution within a couple, as illustrated in Figure 2. The 
respondent’s partner is the same for the studied period in the sample, and thus, the gaps 
do not change during the period. A zero indicates that the age values are the same within 
a couple. Figure 2 demonstrates that the percentages of couples with no age gap are higher 
than the other groups for both genders. However, the age difference between men and 
women is not symmetrical, with a higher percentage of men than women that are older 
than their partners.  
Table 1 also reveals the age gaps regarding the respondents’ and partners’ parents, 
which implies that the father is older than the mother. These indicate that the husbands’ 
ages are greater than the wives’, which is generally observed in existing works (e.g., 
Grossbard et al., 2014; Lee and McKinnish, 2018). Regarding the respondent parents’ age 
gaps, the gap in the men’s sample is measured by the equation “(father’s age – mother’s 
age),” while the gap in the women’s sample is measured by “(mother’s age – father’s 
age).” This is because we aim to explore the effects from parents with the same gender as 
the respondent and the latter’s relationship to the different gendered parent to consider 
how the respondent’s gender identity formed. Specifically, in the men’s sample, we 
compare the age gap (his age – his wife’s age) with his parents’ age gap (his father’s age 
– his mother’s age). In the women’s sample, we compare the age gap (her age – her 
husband’s age) with her parents’ age gap (her mother’s age – her father’s age). The parents’ 
gap demonstrates the positive and negative values for the men’s and women’s samples, 
respectively. The partner parents’ gaps also suggest the same results. Collectively, this 
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indicates that the fathers are older than the mothers. Therefore, the respondents inherited 
their spousal age gap patterns from their parents.  
The questionnaire also asks about the respondents’ hours spent on housework. 
Additionally, seven specific items query the allocation of housework hours between 
spouses. We can use this data to estimate the housework hours of respondent husbands 
and wives, although we do not ask how housework hours are allocated to specific 
housework activities. Aside from questions regarding housework hours, we also ask about 
the allocation of specific housework within a household—divided into “respondent’s 
share,” “partner’s share,” and “others’ share” categories—to obtain information regarding 
the respondent’s share of seven housework categories.9 We aggregate this information to 
calculate the respondent’s share of total housework, although we exclude childcare from 
our definition of “housework” because the couples in our sample did not have children 
before marriage or cohabitation.10  
 
Table 1 indicates women spent on average 135.7 minutes on housework per day, or 
more than twice as long as men. The housework allocation indicates that women are 
burdened with 71% of the housework, while men only assume approximately 39%.  
Figure 3 illustrates the average housework time in the sample period, while Figure 4 
indicates the allocation (%) of housework. The horizontal line is defined the same as in 
Figure 1. We consider that the sample size is not large enough to suggest unbiased results 
when observations are less than 20 in each time period. Thus, we restricted the time period 
to those that contain more than 20 observations to illustrate Figures 3 and 4. A cursory 
examination of Figure 3 suggests that women’s housework time is consistently longer 
than men’s, even in the pre-marriage period. However, the gap distinctly widened after 
marriage or cohabitation, as women’s housework time remarkably increased while men’s 
housework time increased slightly as time passed. Regarding Figure 4, the housework 
allocation gap between men and women widened over time, similar to Figure 3. However, 
                                                     
9 The seven categories are “cooking,” “clear the dishes from the table,” “cleaning and 
sweeping,” “washing,” shopping,” “taking out the garbage,” and “childcare.” 
10 Grossbard et al. (2014) also exclude childcare from our definition of “housework” because 
previous works have reported that parents found spending time with their children more 
enjoyable than other kinds of housework (Kahneman et al., 2004; Kahneman and Krueger, 
2006). 
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the former differs from Figure 3, in that the share of housework at the initial time point is 
almost same between partners. The women’s allocation of housework then increased after 
marriage, while men’s decreased over the course of time. Our interpretation reveals that 
although men’s time spent on housework increased, women spent predominantly more 
time than men; thus, men’s allocation of housework decreased. Collectively, a division of 
labor within a household can be observed after marriage (or cohabitation). Our 
interpretation in Figures 3 and 4 illustrates that before marriage or cohabitation, men who 
have lived alone tend to do housework for themselves; thus, the allocation increased even 
though they have not spent substantial time on housework. 
Individuals learn much from their parents in their childhood, and are consequently 
influenced by the marital relationship between their parents. For instance, their parents 
can impact their selection of a marital partner. As we have observed in Table 1, 
respondents’ and their partners’ fathers are older than their mothers, on average. We more 
closely examine this by confirming the correlation between the parents’ and respondents’ 
spousal age gaps. Table 2 indicates that the respondents’ spousal age gap is positively 
correlated with their and their partner’s parents’ age gap. Therefore, the selection of a 
marital partner seems to be influenced by the couple’s parents, who provide a spousal 
model for their children that inevitably influences the child’s selection of marital partner 
later in life. Consequently, similar spousal relationships occur. Further, a noteworthy, 
positive correlation can be observed between the respondent parents’ age gap and that of 
their partner. This indicates that respondents select partners with similar family 
backgrounds, reflected in the spousal age gap; thus, the marital couple shares an identity 
formed through their parents’ marital relationship. 
We then confirm the inference that older spouses can compensate for their disutility 
by assuming a larger allocation of housework. Table 3 compares the housework time 
before and after the marriage, according to groups divided by the spousal differences in 
age. The upper part of the panel illustrates the men’s sample, which indicates that 
respondents have spent a longer time on housework after marriage than before marriage 
in all groups. Further, in the group with men older than their wives, the men spent 29 
minutes longer on housework after the marriage than before. The differences are 13 and 
3 minutes for the same age groups and groups in which the husband is younger than his 
wife, respectively. Hence, a larger difference in housework hours can be observed as 
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men’s ages are relatively higher than their wives’. The same tendency is also observed 
for the women’s sample in the lower part of the panel. However, the women’s level of 
time is remarkably longer than the men’s. Additionally, the difference in time between 
the periods for women is remarkably longer than for men.  
Similarly, Table 4 compares the allocation of housework, although it differs from 
Table 3 in that the former notes a lower allocation of housework for men after marriage 
than before. However, the difference decreases if the man is relatively older than his wife, 
which implies that men relatively older than their wives are more likely to carry the 
burden of housework after marriage. Alternatively, women assume a larger burden of 
housework after marriage than before. The increase in the wife’s allocation is 16% for the 
group of women older than their husbands, which is a larger share than in other groups. 
Collectively, the observations of Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with the inferences stated 
in Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
We then scrutinize how marriage changes housework time and allocation by 
decomposing this into the outcomes of partner selections and intra-household bargaining. 
The following section introduces a simple methodological framework to meet this 
objective. 
 
3.2. Methods 
 
We test our hypotheses by exploring how the spousal age gaps among respondents 
and their parents impact hours of housework. The estimated function takes the following 
form: 
 
Houseworkit  
=α1Gap of agei *Married it+α2Gap of agesi*Marital duration it +α3Marital duration it 
+α7Parents’ gap of ages i *Married it+α8Parents’ gap of agesi* Marital duration it 
+α9Partner’s parents’ gap of agesi*Married it+α10 Partner’s parents’ gap of agesi* 
Marital durationit++α11 Working motheri*Married it+α12 Working motheri*Marital 
durationit+ Xit + ki + et+ u it,                                    
 
where Houseworkit represents the minutes of housework per day (or the allocation of 
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housework) for respondent i and time period t, and α represents the independent variables’ 
marginal effect. The panel data feature allows us to control for the time-invariant, 
individual-fixed effect ki, and the time period effect et, while u it, is the error term.  
As described in Table 1, these gaps are calculated as the “(respondent’s age – their 
partner’s age).” As proxies for bargaining power, we use the age differences between 
partners, expressed as Gap of age (Booth and Kee, 2009). The spousal age gap’s effects 
can be decomposed into the partner selection and bargaining effects. The key variables 
are the cross-terms of the spousal age gaps and a dummy for getting married (or 
cohabitation): Gap of ages*Married. This effect represents the partner selection effect, 
rather than the bargaining effect captured by Gap of ages*duration; specifically, younger 
men tend to marry girlfriends who tend to assume a larger burden of housework to 
compensate for his disutility. Older women who prefer housework as part of their gender 
identity might marry boyfriends who prefer she assume housework responsibilities to 
compensate for his disutility in having an older wife. Namely, the partner selection effect 
is possibly reflected in how the spousal gap influences the housework allocation between 
husband and wife. Thus, it is necessary to decompose the spousal age gap’s effect into the 
partner selection effect before marriage and the intra-household bargaining effect after 
marriage.  
In more recent work using panel data from Australia, Lee and McKinnish (2018) 
decomposed the spousal age gap’s effect into its impact on satisfaction levels at the time 
of marriage and the changes in satisfaction over the duration of marriage. They discovered 
that individuals tended to be more satisfied with younger spouses at the time of marriage, 
and less satisfied with those who were older. As time passed, marital satisfaction 
decreased more in differently aged couples than those who were similarly aged (Lee and 
McKinnish, 2018).11 We follow Lee and McKinnish’s (2018) specification by including 
Gap of ages*Marital duration, an interaction term. Thus, the Gap of ages*Marital 
duration can be interpreted as capturing the effects of intra-household bargaining through 
marital life after controlling for the partner selection effect by Gap of ages*Married. 
These interaction terms are anticipated to be positive based on Hypotheses 1 and 4, while 
                                                     
11 Sohn (2016) found that women with taller husbands experienced happiness after marriage, 
but these effects declined as time passed. 
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Hypothesis 2 leads us to predict that women exhibit a greater coefficient than men women 
exhibit a greater coefficient than men. 
The relationships between parents possibly form the child’s view (or preference) about 
the division of labor within a household. This can consequently influence the child’s time 
allocation within a household after the child marries in adulthood. We thus obtain such 
variables as the respondent parents’ and partner parents’ spousal age gaps. As described 
in Table 1, these gaps are the “(father’s or mother’s) value – the (mother’s or father’s) 
value when the respondent is (male or female),” respectively. Booth and Kee (2009) 
revealed that a woman’s fertility depends on the size of her family of origin, as well as 
that of her husband’s. This indicates that decision-making within a household is 
influenced by the spouse’s origin-family characteristics through a family-specific cultural 
transmission. Therefore, we must also examine the effect of partner parents’ age gaps. 
Hence, in the same way that the spousal age gap’s interaction term was created, Parents 
(partner’s parents) gap of ages*Marital duration and Parents (partner’s parents) gap of 
ages*Marriage are included to consider the effect of identities inherited from parents. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 lead us to predict that these interaction terms have a positive sign for 
women.  
Aside from parents’ age gaps, we follow existing works (e.g., Fernandez et al., 2004; 
Kawaguchi and Miyazaki, 2009) to anticipate the mother’s work status will determine 
preferences and perspectives about the allocation of time within a household. We interpret 
this effect as forming gender identity, and test this effect by including Working mother 
*Marital duration and Working mother*Marriage. Mothers who work full-time during 
one’s childhood are thought to spend less time on housework; if so, the woman will 
decrease her allocation of housework, while the man will increase it. These interaction 
terms for the working mother are predicted to have negative and positive signs for females 
and males, respectively. 
One critical issue involves controlling for bias, and instrumental variables (IVs) are 
traditionally used to control it. However, it is difficult to discover valid IVs, as we have 
already controlled for individual-fixed effects, and most potential IVs are captured by 
fixed effects.12 Thus, we attempted to disentangle the intra-household bargaining and 
                                                     
12 Lee and McKinnish (2018) controlled for a similar bias from mate selection by attempting to 
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partner selection effects as noted above.  
Various other factors can be controlled by a vector of control variables Xit , including 
dummies for employment status, the number of children, and the respondent’s or partner’s 
period of pregnancy. These control variables are included in all specifications, although 
their results are not presented in Tables 5 to 8.  
 
4. Results and Interpretation 
 
Tables 5 to 8 illustrate the fixed effects’ estimation results based on the men’s and 
women’s samples, respectively. Tables 5 and 6 provide the results when housework hours 
are the dependent variable, while Tables 7 and 8 exhibit results for the allocation of 
housework as the dependent variable. Respondents’ ages across the generation gap are 
thought to influence the results; therefore, robust standard errors are clustered by age. 
We can observe from Table 5—based on the male sample—that the interaction terms 
for Gap of ages*Married indicate a negative sign for most results. However, not all 
columns exhibit statistical significance. For example, no statistical significance can be 
observed for the interaction terms for the parents’ age gap. In our interpretation, the male’s 
gender identity plays a key role, as this can discourage men to assume the burden of 
housework (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). This identity is considered as neutralizing males’ 
motivation to do housework to compensate for his wife’s disutility from having an older 
husband. We should carefully focus on the possibility that household activities can be 
outsourced (Burda et al., 2008), although we cannot further examine this due to data 
limitations. If this is the case, men might earn more to employ a maid or order housework 
services instead of the wives assuming the burden of housework. In contrast, the 
coefficients for Working mother*Marital duration and Working mother*Married indicate 
positive signs. Columns 4 to 6 in Table 5 reveal Working mother*Marital duration is 
statistically significant, suggesting that husbands who had full-time working mothers in 
childhood tend to increase their housework hours to support their wives as a consequence 
of intra-household bargaining.  
                                                     
conduct IV estimations, but could not discover any valid IVs. Grossbard and Mukhopadhyay 
(2017) used panel data to conduct IV estimations, but could not use the IV method when 
controlling for fixed effects because the IVs are time-invariant. 
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Concerning the control variables, the coefficient of Children produces significant, 
positive signs in all columns, which indicates that the emergence of children will lead 
husbands to increase their housework hours.  
Regarding the results of Table 6, and consistent with the female gender (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2000; Booth and Van Ours, 2009), Married exhibits a positive, significant sign 
in all columns, implying that marriage (or cohabitation) leads women to increase their 
housework hours. Further, the Gap of ages*Married and Gap of ages*Marital duration 
demonstrate positive signs in all results; Gap of ages*Married is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all columns, while Gap of ages*Marital duration is not 
significant in any columns. This indicates that the age gap does not influence intra-
household bargaining, although a partner-selection effect can be observed. No statistical 
significance can be observed in any results concerning the interaction terms for the 
parents’ age gaps. 
We now focus on the results of housework allocation in Tables 7 and 8. The results of 
Table 7, which include the male sample, are nearly similar to those in Table 5. Specifically, 
the spousal age gap does not influence men’s housework hours or the allocation of 
housework. Further, Married reveals a negative, significant sign in all columns, which 
reflects a decreased allocation of housework after marriage. The age gap between 
respondents’ mother and father has no influence on the allocation of housework. These 
results do not support Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4. Alternatively, the coefficients of Working 
mother*Marital duration and Working mother*Marriage exhibit positive signs. Columns 
4 and 6 in Table 7 indicate that Working mother*Marital duration is statistically 
significant; therefore, men are influenced by their mothers’ work status in childhood to 
share the housework with his wife after marriage. This parallels existing works 
(Fernandez et al., 2004; Kawaguchi and Miyazaki, 2009).  
We can observe in Table 8 that the Gap of ages*Married and Gap of ages*Marital 
duration are positive and statistically significant in most cases. The spousal age gap leads 
women to increase their allocation of housework through both the partner selection and 
intra-household bargaining effects. One compelling observation is that Parents Gap of 
ages*Marital duration exhibits a positive sign and statistical significance, while Parents 
Gap of ages*Marriage indicates a positive sign, but no statistical significance. These 
imply that respondents’ parental age gaps lead women to increase their allocation of 
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housework through intra-household bargaining, but not through their partner selection. 
We assume here that the wife older than her husband assumes a larger allocation of 
housework to compensate for her husband’s disutility. This situation contributes to 
forming her daughter’s identity to assume more housework as a consequence of 
bargaining with a younger husband. These results support Hypotheses 1 to 4. Consistent 
with our prediction, the coefficients of Working mother*Marital duration and Working 
mother*Marriage exhibit negative signs, although these are not statistically significant. 
Hence, working mothers had no substantial impact on their daughters’ decreased 
housework allocation. One possible interpretation is that women’s gender identity to 
prefer housework is sufficiently large to neutralize the effects of the mother’s work status. 
In considering Tables 5 to 8, it can be posited that the mother’s work status influences 
sons’ housework allocation after marriage, but not daughters’.  
Collectively, the results from Tables 5 to 8 support Hypotheses 1 to 4, proposed in 
Section 2. Our observations thus far allow us to derive the following conclusions: younger 
husbands experience disutility in their marriages to older wives, but compensate for this 
by assuming a larger allocation of his wife’s housework as a consequence of intra-
household bargaining. In contrast, gender identities lead wives with older husbands to 
compensate for her disutility by his larger earnings. Unfortunately, we cannot analyze 
spouses’ earnings, as our dataset only includes the family’s total earnings. Further, 
individual gender identities form through learning from parents’ lifestyles, and thus, the 
spousal age gap has long-term effects not only on the couple’s allocation of housework, 
but also on their children’s allocation of housework after marriage.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Various works have studied how spousal age gaps relate to the allocation of housework. 
However, research thus far has failed to scrutinize the effects of parents’ age gaps. 
Individuals are fundamentally influenced by their parents’ lifestyles, and form their own 
identities to determine their decision-making in various situations later in life. First, we 
use a novel dataset to compare the effects of spousal gaps between genders by considering 
gender identity. Further, we consider how parent characteristics, such as the parents’ age 
gap and mother’s work status, play a role in forming this identity, thus influencing the 
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allocation of housework between spouses. One innovation in this paper involves its 
investigation of the intergenerational transmission and allocation of housework between 
the genders.  
 We originally collected individual-level data through monthly Internet surveys for 37 
months. At the initial survey point, respondents were unmarried with the intent to marry 
their partner in the near future. We then tracked the same individuals after their marriage 
occurred to consider how the allocation of housework changed. 
After controlling for individual- and time period-fixed effects, our key findings are as 
follows: (1) Women older than their partners tend to assume a larger amount of housework 
than in the pre-marriage period, and the spousal gap effect increases as the marriage 
duration increases. (2) Women with mothers older than their fathers tend to assume a 
larger allocation of housework as the marriage duration increases, (3) the age gap hardly 
affects men’s allocation of housework, while men who had full-time working mothers at 
age 15 assume a larger allocation of housework as the marital duration increases.   
This implies that for women, the spousal age gap influences not only the selection of 
a mate, but also the allocation of housework as a result of intra-household bargaining. We 
tested our hypotheses by first assuming that mothers older than fathers, as well as fathers 
with full-time working wives, assume a larger amount of housework. Regarding women, 
their identities that form from their parents’ age gap only influenced the allocation of 
housework as an outcome of bargaining. Alternatively, men’s identities as formed through 
having a working mother lead to his assuming a larger amount of housework. 
This paper cannot directly address an endogeneity bias in partner selection, partially 
due to data limitations; however, valid instrumental variables should be used to control 
this. Otherwise, a quasi-experimental setting should be used to scrutinize the age-gap 
effects. These are remaining issues to be addressed in future studies. 
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Fig. 1. Difference of observations according to the timing of marriage or cohabitation.  
 
Note: On the horizontal line, marriage or cohabitation (the latter, if one is not yet 
married) begins at t = 0. The numbers on the x-axis indicate the months before and after 
the marriage event. 
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Fig. 2. Distribution of the age differences between respondents and their partners. 
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Fig. 3. Dynamic effect of marriage or cohabitation on housework hours (the minutes for 
housework in a weekday).  
Note: On the horizontal line, marriage or cohabitation (the latter, if one is not yet 
married) begins at t = 0.  
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Fig. 4. Rate of allocation for housework within a household (percentage of housework).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
-10 0 10 20
Timing of marriage or cohabitation
Man Woman
23 
 
 
Table 1. Basic statistics of variables used in the estimation and mean values for males and females 
Variables Definition Males Females 
Housework hours  Respondent’s housework minutes per day 
 
59.7 135.7 
Allocation 
of housework  
Respondent’s share of housework within a household (%). 38.8 71.0 
Marital duration 
 
Months passed after the marriage or cohabitation 9.46 7.68 
Age 
 
Ages 33.3 30.4 
Gap of ages 
 
(Respondent’s age – Partner’s age) 3.57 −1.31 
Parents’ age gap  
 
Respondent father’s (or mother’s) age – Respondent mother’s (father’s) age 2.77 −3.03 
Partner parents’ age 
gap 
Partner father’s (or mother’s) age – Partner mother’s (or father’s) age 2.53 −1.79 
Working mother 
 
This assumes a value of one if the respondent’s mother worked when the respondent 
was 15 years old, and zero otherwise. 
0.31 0.32 
Married 
 
A value of one of the respondent is currently married or cohabitating with one’s 
partner, and zero otherwise. 
 
0.82 0.80 
Pregnancy period A value of one if the respondent (or partner) is pregnant, and zero otherwise. 0.10 0.09 
    
Children 
 
Number of children 0.24 0.07 
Notes: The parents’ age gap is calculated by the “father’s age − mother’s age” when the respondent is male, while this is the “mother’s age 
− father’s age” when the respondent is woman. We use information about the respondent’s share of six housework categories (“cooking,” 
“clearing dishes from the table,” “cleaning and sweeping,” “washing,” “shopping,” and “taking out the garbage”) to calculate the 
respondents’ share of housework as a whole.
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Table 2. Correlation matrix between the spousal and parental age gaps 
 
 
Note: The parents’ age gap is calculated as the “(father’s age − mother’s age)” when the 
respondent is male, while this is calculated as the “(mother’s age − father’s age)” when 
the respondent is female. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Age Gap with 
Partner 
 
Parents’ Age Gap 
 
Partner Parents’ 
Age Gap 
 
Age gap with 
partner 
 
1 
 
0.24*** 0.34*** 
Parents’ age gap 
 
 
 
1 0.46*** 
Partner parents’ age 
gap 
 
 
 1 
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Table 3. Comparison of housework hours across groups  
 
 
Note: The numerals here are the minutes per day. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Before marriage or 
cohabitation 
   (a) 
After marriage or 
cohabitation 
   (b) 
 Difference  
   
(b) – (a) 
Age>Partner’s Age  
 
  
Age=Partner’s Age  
 
  
Age<Partner’s Age  
 
  
 
Women’s Sample 
   
Age > Partner’s Age      74 
  
  161    87 
Age = Partner’s Age      63 
 
  137    74 
Age < Partner’s Age      92 
 
  142    50 
 
Men’s Sample 
   (a)    (b)   
       50 
 
   79    29 
      36 
 
   49    13 
      44 
 
   47     3 
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Table 4. Comparison of housework allocations across groups  
 
 
Note: The numerals here are percentages (%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Men’s Sample Before Marriage or 
Cohabitation 
   (a) 
After Marriage or 
Cohabitation 
   (b) 
 Difference  
   
(b) – (a) 
Age > Partner’s Age    46 
 
   45   − 1 
Age = Partner’s Age    51 
 
   43     − 8 
Age < Partner’s Age    63 
 
   35    − 18 
 
Women’s Sample 
   
Age > Partner’s Age   61 
 
   77   16 
Age = Partner’s Age   64 
 
   69      5 
Age < Partner’s Age   61 
 
   71     10 
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Table 5. Determinants of housework hours (fixed-effects model): Men’s sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gap of Age 
*Married 
−0.42 
(−0.51) 
−0.33 
(−0.42) 
−0.36 
(−0.44) 
−0.45 
(−0.54) 
−0.39 
(−0.48) 
−0.42 
(−0.49) 
Gap of Age 
* Marital duration 
  
 
 
 
0.01 
(0.41) 
0.01 
(0.42) 
0.01 
(0.48) 
Married 2.51 
(0.58) 
2.97 
(0.66) 
3.78 
(0.96) 
2.04 
(0.51) 
2.31 
(0.55) 
4.33 
(1.23) 
Marital duration    −0.27 
(−0.98) 
−0.27 
(−0.92) 
−0.42 
(−1.36) 
   Parents’ Effect  
Parents’ age gap 
* Married 
0.67 
(0.56) 
0.79 
(0.73) 
 1.24 
(1.06) 
1.36 
(1.27) 
 
 
Partner parents’ age gap 
* Married 
0.44 
(0.70) 
 0.61 
(1.32) 
0.35 
(0.58) 
 0.76 
(1.59) 
Parents’ age gap  
*Marital duration 
   −0.07** 
(−2.41) 
−0.07*** 
(−2.77) 
 
 
Partner parents’ age gap 
* Marital duration 
   −0.01 
(−0.30) 
 −0.03 
(−1.65) 
Working mother 
*Married- 
7.41 
(0.88) 
6.55 
(0.77) 
8.54 
(1.01) 
4.61 
(0.54) 
4.08 
(0.47) 
4.82 
(0.57) 
Working mother 
* Marital duration 
   0.45** 
(2.47) 
0.44** 
(2.47) 
0.49** 
(2.58) 
   Control  
Pregnancy period 
 
4.42 
(1.35) 
4.26 
(1.32) 
4.64 
(1.42) 
3.62 
(1.06) 
3.73 
(1.13) 
4.51 
(1.34) 
Children 
 
13.2*** 
(3.72) 
12.1*** 
(3.69) 
13.4*** 
(3.76) 
12.1*** 
(3.04) 
11.4*** 
(3.12) 
13.0*** 
(3.24) 
Ages −4.41 
(−1.67) 
−4.35 
(−1.59) 
−4.33 
(−1.64) 
−4.24 
(−1.61) 
−4.19 
(−1.55) 
−4.19 
(−1.55) 
Observations 2879 2923 2885 2879 2923 2885 
Number of Individuals  155 158 156 155 158 156 
R-square 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Note: The married-cohabitating, time period, job status, and individual dummies are 
included in all estimations, although their results are not reported. The numbers in 
parentheses are t-values, based on robust standard errors clustered by age. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6. Determinants of housework hours (fixed-effects model): Women’s sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gap of Age 
*Married 
2.56*** 
(3.32) 
2.99*** 
(4.06) 
2.50*** 
(3.31) 
2.37*** 
(3.04) 
2.36*** 
(2.77) 
2.39*** 
(3.19) 
Gap of Age 
* Marital duration 
   0.01 
(0.28) 
0.07 
(0.94) 
0.01 
(0.29) 
Married 109.5*** 
(7.02) 
105.9*** 
(6.90) 
98.4*** 
(8.32) 
102.9*** 
(7.53) 
98.9*** 
(6.94) 
96.8*** 
(8.88) 
Marital duration    −0.46 
(−0.39) 
−0.61 
(−0.51) 
−1.51** 
(−2.30) 
   Parents’ Effect  
Parents’ age gap  
* Married 
3.28 
(1.26) 
3.90 
(1.66) 
 1.95 
(0.84) 
2.67 
(1.18) 
 
 
Partner parents’ age gap 
* Married 
1.80 
(0.52) 
 2.06 
(0.60) 
1.76 
(0.54) 
 1.84 
(0.56) 
Parents’ age gap  
*Marital duration 
   0.16 
(0.93) 
0.13 
(0.76) 
 
 
Partner parents’ age gap 
* Marital duration 
   0.01 
(0.08) 
 0.01 
(0.20) 
Working mother 
*Married- 
−2.85 
(−0.16) 
1.16 
(0.06) 
5.33 
(0.30) 
−8.80 
(−0.47) 
−6.60 
(−0.35) 
−4.09 
(−0.21) 
Working mother 
* Marital duration 
   0.57 
(0.62) 
0.74 
(0.90) 
1.09 
(1.54) 
   Control  
Pregnancy period 
 
14.3* 
(1.75) 
8.91 
(1.14) 
12.4 
(1.46) 
17.7** 
(2.38) 
11.3 
(1.54) 
14.9* 
(1.75) 
Children 
 
41.1* 
(1.91) 
44.9** 
(2.15) 
40.5* 
(1.81) 
45.0** 
(2.24) 
47.1** 
(2.41) 
43.1** 
(2.01) 
Ages 1.13 
(0.18) 
−1.32 
(−0.19) 
1.24 
(0.20) 
1.39 
(0.23) 
−0.92 
(−0.13) 
1.51 
(0.25) 
Observations 2579 2745 2579 2579 2745 2579 
Number of Individuals  163 175 163 163 175 163 
R-square 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 
Note: The married-cohabitating, time period, job status, and individual dummies are 
included in all estimations, although their results are not reported. The numbers in 
parentheses are t-values, based on robust standard errors clustered by age. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7. Determinants of housework allocation (fixed-effects model): Men’s sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gap of Age 
*Married 
−0.08 
(−0.21) 
−0.01 
(−0.01) 
−0.09 
(−0.22) 
−0.43 
(−0.11) 
 0.02 
(0.06) 
−0.06 
(−0.25) 
Gap of Age 
* Marital duration 
   −0.001 
(−0.13) 
−0.001 
(−0.12) 
−0.001 
(−0.05) 
Married −15.7*** 
(−3.57) 
−14.9*** 
(−3.65) 
−15.7*** 
(−3.94) 
−16.5*** 
(−2.87) 
−15.9*** 
(−2.98) 
−16.0*** 
(−2.94) 
Marital duration    −0.23 
(−0.43) 
−0.24 
(−0.43) 
−0.30 
(−0.57) 
   Parents’ Effect  
Parents’ age gap 
* Married 
0.05 
(0.12) 
0.17 
(0.40) 
 0.30 
(0.63) 
0.42 
(0.91) 
 
 
Partner parents’ age gap 
* Married 
0.45 
(0.68) 
 0.49 
(0.78) 
0.39 
(0.62) 
 0.53 
(0.85) 
Parents’ age gap  
*Marital duration 
   −0.03 
(−1.59) 
−0.03 
(−1.69) 
 
 
Partner parents’ age gap 
* Marital duration 
   −0.01 
(−0.06) 
 −0.01 
(−0.63) 
Working mother 
*Married- 
8.33* 
(1.84) 
7.50 
(1.56) 
8.53* 
(1.87) 
7.29 
(1.62) 
6.58 
(1.41) 
7.10 
(1.54) 
Working mother 
* Marital duration 
   0.19* 
(1.75) 
0.19 
(1.64) 
0.21* 
(1.93) 
   Control  
Pregnancy period 
 
2.88 
(1.48) 
2.57 
(1.35) 
2.95 
(1.49) 
2.49 
(1.29) 
2.28 
(1.21) 
2.84 
(1.43) 
Children 
 
4.06** 
(2.45) 
3.88** 
(2.51) 
4.09** 
(2.50) 
3.86** 
(2.43) 
3.81** 
(2.57) 
4.20** 
(2.55) 
Ages −3.26** 
(−2.66) 
−3.25** 
(−2.74) 
−3.24** 
(−2.68) 
−3.14** 
(−2.49) 
−3.12** 
(−2.54) 
−3.14** 
(−2.47) 
Observations 2881 2925 2887 2881 2925 2887 
Number of Individuals  155 158 156 155 158 156 
R-square 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Note: The married-cohabitating, time period, job status, and individual dummies are 
included in all estimations, although their results are not reported. The numbers in 
parentheses are t-values, based on robust standard errors clustered by age. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 8. Determinants of housework allocation (fixed-effects model): Women’s sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gap of Age 
*Married 
0.40*** 
(2.87) 
0.57** 
(2.72) 
0.38*** 
(2.88) 
0.30** 
(2.19) 
0.40* 
(1.95) 
0.30** 
(2.10) 
Gap of Age 
* Marital duration 
   0.01* 
(1.88) 
0.02*** 
(2.72) 
0.01 
(1.52) 
Married 13.9*** 
(7.39) 
13.0*** 
(7.47) 
11.7*** 
(5.58) 
10.8*** 
(5.30) 
10.0*** 
(5.02) 
10.2*** 
(4.50) 
Marital duration    0.12 
(0.62) 
0.13 
(0.73) 
−0.22 
(−0.99) 
   Parents’ Effect  
Parents’ age gap  
* Married 
0.64 
(1.47) 
0.74** 
(2.16) 
 0.26 
(0.58) 
0.46 
(1.21) 
 
Partner parents’ age gap 
* Married 
0.77*** 
(3.11) 
 0.82*** 
(3.48) 
0.92** 
(2.01) 
 0.91** 
(2.05) 
Parents’ age gap  
*Marital duration 
   0.06*** 
(2.91) 
0.04** 
(2.46) 
 
 
Partner parents’ age gap 
* Marital duration 
   −0.02 
(−0.49) 
 −0.01 
(−0.42) 
Working mother 
*Married- 
−2.21 
(−0.73) 
−1.65 
(−0.69) 
−0.61 
(−0.23) 
−0.01 
(−0.00) 
−0.01 
(−0.00) 
0.68 
(0.18) 
Working mother 
* Marital duration 
   −0.38 
(−1.69) 
−0.31 
(−1.46) 
−0.20 
(−1.04) 
   Control  
Pregnancy period 
 
−5.02*** 
(−3.74) 
−5.50*** 
(−4.87) 
−5.38*** 
(−3.40) 
−4.49*** 
(−3.11) 
−5.35*** 
(−4.68) 
−5.32*** 
(−3.23) 
Children 
 
−1.45 
(−1.02) 
−0.50 
(−0.32) 
−1.67 
(−1.18) 
−0.79 
(−0.50) 
−0.54 
(−0.34) 
−1.41 
(−0.83) 
Ages 0.32 
(0.02) 
−0.10 
(−0.07) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.16 
(0.09) 
Observations 2581 2747 2581 2581 2747 2581 
Number of Individuals  163 175 163 163 175 163 
R-square 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Note: The married-cohabitating, time period, job status, and individual dummies are 
included in all estimations, although their results are not reported. The numbers in 
parentheses are t-values, based on robust standard errors clustered by age. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
